Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Sentence meaning: in contrast to the case of word meaning, the composition of the parts of the sentence must be taken into account for the sentence meaning. The so-called use theory of meaning does not apply to whole sentences. See also compositionality, use, use theory, truth values, context/context dependency._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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W.V.O. Quine on Sentence Meaning - Dictionary of Arguments
V 62f Def Sentence meaning/Quine: the meaning of a sentence is in the observations that would confirm or refute it. - - - X 18 Sentence meaning/Quine: is apparently identical to facts: e.g. that snow is white. Both have the same name: that snow is white. That sounds like correspondence theory, but as such it is empty talk. There is only agreement between the two intangible elements to which we have referred as intermediaries between the German sentence and the white snow: Meaning and fact. VsQuine: one could object, that this takes the intermediaries (meaning and fact) too literally. X 19 If one speaks of meaning as a factor of truth in the sentence, one can say that the English sentence "Snow is white" would have been wrong if, for example, the word "white" had been applied to green things in English. And the reference to a fact is just a saying. Quine: very good. As long as we don't have to assume propositions with this. Proposition/QuineVsPropositions: as a meaning of sentences as an abstract entity with its own right. Some authors: consider them as what is true/false and between which the implications exist. X 20 Sentence Meaning/Quine: it is completely unclear (which is often claimed) that sentences have the same or different meaning. - - - XI 85 Sentence Meaning/Quine/Lauener: exhausts itself accordingly in the consequences that the sentence can have for the sensory experience. - - - XII 89 Sentence Meaning/Partial Sentence/Subclause/Term/Word/Meaning/Use Theory/Quine: whole sentences are undeniably meaningful, and therefore also the use they make of their partial expressions. - - - IV 425 Uncertainty of translation: when we talk about the so-called analytical hypothesis (translation manuals), we are talking about the meaning of sentences. - In contrast, the term "inscrutability of reference" is concerned with words or expressions below the sentence level (subsentential). - - - VI 142 Propositions/QuineVsPropositions: are not sentence meanings. This shows the uncertainty of the translation. See also >Propositions/Quine._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |